The Woodlands DWI Lawyer

Probable Cause is where it all begins when you find yourself arrested for DWI in The Woodlands, TX. It is critical your Woodlands DWI lawyer examine the facts surrounding your traffic stop for one simple reason, if the police did not have probable cause to stop you then certain evidence obtained through the unlawful stop may be excluded from being used against you. Without certain evidence, the prosecutor’s case against you may be much weaker or entirely unsupportable. Call (832) 426-3913 to speak with a Woodlands DWI lawyer and take the first step in protecting your rights today.

What Is Probable Cause?

Probable Cause is a legal term used to determine if the police had a sufficient legal justification to stop and question you. The Constitution places limitations on the authority of police to stop and question people, they must have some reason for doing so. If police cross the legal line of questioning people without valid legal authority then they risk evidence being suppressed at trial.

The Facts of the Alderete Case

On November 5, 2007, at approximately 3 a.m., two officers were traveling west on Interstate 10 when they observed Alderete driving a Jeep Cherokee in front of them, in the same lane. As they followed Alderete, Officer Alegre observed her swerving inside the lane. Traffic was light, but the officers could not recall whether Alderete came close to contacting or endangering another car. The officers could not recall how many times they saw the vehicle swerve, but after following Alderete for half of a mile, Officer Alegre noted she was unable to drive in a straight manner and stay within the lane. Consequently, the officers initiated a traffic stop, not because she violated the traffic code, but because she was swerving within her lane at a late hour, which based on their experience, indicated that she was intoxicated.

Based on the testimony presented, Alderete asserted that there was no evidence of intoxication and that swerving within a lane is not a traffic violation; thus, she asked the trial court to grant her motion to suppress on grounds that the officers lacked authority to initiate a stop. The State disagreed, arguing that although a traffic code violation may not have been committed, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Alderete for driving while intoxicated. The trial court agreed with Alderte. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that the officers’ testimonies were credible, but concluded that Alderete’s swerving within the lane was not a traffic code violation and therefore, that the officers lacked authority to initiate a stop.

Discussion

On appeal, the State asserts in a single issue that the trial court erred by granting Alderete’s motion to suppress. According to the State, the officers did not need to find a violation of the traffic code before stopping Alderete as they had reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop for driving while intoxicated when, in light of their training and experience, Alderete swerved within her lane, at a late hour, for half of a mile, which indicated that she was intoxicated. Alderete responds that no traffic violation occurred and her swerving within the lane, at a late hour, was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that she was driving while intoxicated.

Applicable Law

A law-enforcement officer is justified in detaining a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is violating the law. “Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” The reasonable suspicion determination disregards the subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether there was an objective basis for the stop

Application

Here, the trial court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Alderete because her swerving did not violate the traffic code. However, there is no requirement that a traffic regulation must be violated in order for an officer to have sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a stop of a vehicle. Rather, an officer may be justified in stopping a vehicle based upon a reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated, which is a penal offense. In this case, Officer Garcia testified that Alderete was stopped not because of a violation of the traffic code, but based on suspicion of intoxication, an argument articulated by the prosecutor and implicitly rejected by the trial court.

The record reflects that the stop occurred at 3 a.m., and Officer Garcia testified that most driving-while-intoxicated offenses occur between 9 p.m. and 7 a.m. Alderete was unable to drive in a straight manner as she swerved within her lane for half of a mile on the interstate, a much longer period of time than the few hundred yards observed in Curtis.

Both officers testified that they were trained to detect individuals driving while intoxicated and that weaving is a common characteristic of intoxicated drivers. Finally, both officers stated that they received training in investigating driving-while-intoxicated offenses and had in fact investigated many such offenses. When viewing the totality of the circumstances and considering the officers’ collective training and experience in investigating driving-while-intoxicated offenses, the Court of Appeals found the officers could have formed reasonable suspicion to stop Alderete on suspicion of driving while intoxicated when she continuously swerved within her lane for half of a mile in the early morning hours.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s focus on the sole issue of weaving within the lane not giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a traffic-code violation was committed, was error in that the court failed to consider whether the officers had reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Alderete was driving while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals therefore found that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Alderete’s motion to suppress.